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The psychology of religion has long attempted to clearly identify religion’s effects on 
individuals’ beliefs and attitudes. Many of these results have been contradictory, with 
some indicating religion to have prosocial effects while others indicating the opposite. 
The current studies were designed to explore a possible alternative explanation; that 
cultural variables, specifically honor ideology, might react differently with different 
religious orientations, producing the contradictory results seen within the psychology of 
religion. Across three studies, we identified if there was a relationship at all between 
measures of honor ideology and simple categorical religious identification, identified 
and classified specific relationships between measures of different honor facets and 
religious orientations, and finally experimentally induced a “faith/honor conflict” 
between honor ideology and religious orientation. Results of these studies indicated that 
religion’s prosocial/antisocial effects may depend on the interplay between religious 
orientation and different facets of honor ideology. Implications of these findings are 
discussed.  





“Ye have heard that it hath been said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,’ but I 
say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, 
turn to him the other also… Ye have heard that it hath been said, ‘Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor and hate thine enemy.’ But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that 
curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, 
and persecute you.” 
 -Matthew 5:38-39, 43-44, The King James Bible 
 Due to religion’s fundamental role in both human history and everyday 
experience, it is not surprising that psychology has attempted to better understand 
religion and its influence on human thought and behavior. However, much like its 
subject matter, the psychological study of religion has been marked by controversy and 
contradictions. On the one hand, there is a rich body of research indicating religion can 
have prosocial effects, including generosity and increased beneficence towards out-
groups (Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Shen, Haggard, Strassburger, & Rowatt, 2013; 
Everett, Haque, & Rand, 2016) and lessening hostility after provocation (Schumman, 
McGregor, Nash, & Ross, 2014). However, an equally rich body of research indicates 
the opposite, demonstrating that religion predicts prejudice and hostility towards 
outgroups (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010; LaBouff, Rowat, Johnson, & FInkle, 
2012; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009) as well as desensitizing its 
adherents to, and even encouraging aggression (Shaw, Quezada, & Zárate, 2011; 
Widman, 2011; Bushman et al, 2006). Thus, it would seem that there is a paradox 
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within the psychology of religion, indicating that religion is both prosocial and 
antisocial, producing diametrically opposed behaviors in its practitioners.  
 Burch-Brown and Baker (2016) comment that “[Religion’s] influence [on 
behavior] will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices of the 
community, and on their interaction with the broader society in which they are based” 
(p. 16). This suggests that the contradictory findings in the psychology of religion may 
be due in part to a sociocultural variable moderating the relationship between religion 
and the aforementioned prosocial and antisocial outcomes. I believer honor to be such a 
variable. The empirical study of honor ideology has linked honor to several of the same 
antisocial phenomena as religion, especially hostility/mistrust toward outgroups and 
aggression. Thus, it is possible that individuals’ levels of honor ideology might 
moderate the relationship between their religiosity and their tendency toward antisocial 
behavior. Alternately, the relationship between religiosity and antisocial behavior might 
be due to a potential overlap in honor ideology and religiosity, meaning that a mediation 
relationship might be present. I believe it profitable to examine both of these 
possibilities, moderation and mediation, in order to bring clarity to the paradox within 
the psychology of religion, and to elucidate the association between honor and 
religiosity. 
Honor Ideology and the Culture of Honor 
The first social-psychological and sociological studies of honor culture 
originated as an attempt to explain the notably higher rates of homicide in the Southern 
U.S. (Gastil, 1971). This phenomenon was attributed to the South’s cultural norms, 
originally transplanted by its Scots-Irish immigrants to the new frontier (Fischer, 1991; 
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Nisbett, 1993). Over time, these norms came together to form a “culture of honor” in 
which one’s reputation in the eyes of one’s peers is valued as having supreme 
importance. Both the aggression and the politeness which are so strongly associated 
with the American South have been attributed to the fundamental role that honor 
ideology plays in Southern culture (Cohen and Nisbett, 1997; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, 
& Rantilla, 1999; Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom, 2008). 
 The focus of honor research in social psychology has since expanded beyond the 
American South to other countries and cultures including, but not limited to Spain, 
Turkey, Italy, South/Latin America, and Northern Europe (Mosquera, Manstead, & 
Fischer, 2002a; Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franiuk, 2009; Cross, Uskul, Swing, 
Alozkan, & Ataca, 2012). As a part of broadening the geographic focus of studying 
cultures of honor, honor ideology is beginning to be examined as an evolutionary 
survival mechanism, rather than a culturally unique occurrence (Nisbett and Cohen, 
1996; Shackelford, 2005; Nowak, Gelfland, Borkowski, Cohen, & Hernandez, 2015). 
This research has identified two key factors that play a fundamental role in the 
emergence of a culture of honor: a tough environment in which it is difficult to survive, 
and ineffective/non-present authorities (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996; Nowak et al., 2015). 
 When environments are extremely tough or hostile, one’s materials and goods, 
such as clothing and food, become fundamental to survival. In the early days of honor 
research, it was hypothesized that honor was especially linked to herding cultures, like 
that of the Scots-Irish who settled the early American South. Such herding cultures 
typify the economic vulnerability and weak law enforcement which are deemed 
necessary to the development of an honor culture. In a herding society, one’s livestock 
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are one’s only source of income and survival. If they are stolen or killed, one suffers 
irreparable damage, as that animal might never be regained and can no longer be relied 
on to provide the milk/meat/money that one had assumed that it would. When no strong 
or effective government/law enforcement is present to ensure the protection of 
fundamental goods, individuals, especially men, must become their own source of 
protection via what is called “the rule of retaliation” (Shackelford, 2005; Brown, 
Carvallo, & Imura, 2014). 
 Shackelford (2005) explains the rule of retaliation as the necessity of 
individuals, especially men, to respond with “violence or the threat of violence to any 
affront,” lest one leave people, especially the affront-giver, with the impression that one 
lacks the ability/willingness to protect one’s property and self (p. 383). Nisbett and 
Cohen (1996) similarly identify the	lex talionis	as a man’s “stance of willingness to 
commit mayhem and to risk wounds or death for himself” (p. 15) in defense of self, 
reputation, family, or property. It is important to note that it is not only direct threats 
against property that warrant hostile retaliatory action, but also threats against 
reputation. If one is thought of as strong, tough, and vengeful, one is less likely to be 
viewed as a potential victim. Thus an honorable individual is one possessed of these 
traits, and as long as one can be sure that one’s peers are convinced of one’s 
“honorable” status, one can rest easier regarding any potential threats to self or 
property.  
While the conditions that produced many cultures of honor are gone, research 
indicates that “the rule of retaliation” is still in full effect; if one’s honor is threatened, 
one must defend it via violent retribution, in a process often referred to as “reputation 
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management” (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, Vandello, Puente, & 
Rantilla, 1999). Varying explanations for this phenomenon have been put forward. 
Vandello, Cohen, & Ransom (2008) hypothesize that aggressive norms remain powerful 
in honor cultures because they are perceived as being demanded by the situation and 
society in which they occur. Shackelford (2005) hypothesizes that while actual thefts 
might be uncommon, individuals in a culture of honor may still view certain acts as 
non-physical theft, i.e., adultery may be seen as a man “stealing” another man’s wife, 
etc. Whatever the reason, cultures of honor remain prevalent across the globe, and the 
“rule of retaliation” remains primary in all of them: threaten someone’s honor and 
“you’ll have another thing coming.” 
Multiple Facets of Honor Ideology 
Because much of social psychology’s research on honor ideology has focused 
on the American South, most conceptualizations of honor culture focus around 
retribution-based, masculine honor, described by Nisbett and Cohen (1996) as men’s 
“strength and ability to enforce [their] will on others” (p. 4). However, there are other 
facets of honor. One such facet is feminine honor, which deals with the concept of a 
“good woman,” and which often involves ideas like familial loyalty, spousal devotion, 
self-sacrifice, and sexual purity. Thus, an honorable woman is not one who takes part in 
the rule of retaliation, but instead, one who can be trusted by her 
father/brothers/husband to keep the family and the family’s reputation safe by being 
virtuous (especially regarding sexual purity) and ensuring a stable home life (Leyburn, 
1962; Pitt-Rers, 1966; Schneider, 1971; Fischer, 1991; Wyatt-Brown, 1982; Vandello 
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and Cohen, 2003; Vandello et al., 2009; Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014; Barnes et al., 
2014). 
 Feminine honor’s focus on the family touches on another facet of honor: 
collectivism.  Even in the highly individualistic culture of the Southern U.S., honor 
maintains a collectivist facet because of the related concepts of family and clan (Brown, 
Carvallo, & Imura, 2014). This makes sense when considering honor as a survival 
mechanism; there is safety in numbers. Barnes, Brown, Lenes, Bosson, and Carvallo 
(2014) elaborate on the collectivistic facet of honor: 
[A group identity] could represent a modern manifestation or extension of the 
tribe mentality and clannishness that was so critical to subsistence in the 
tumultuous conditions that gave rise to honor cultures originally. Thus…honor 
endorsers may be pursuing a long- standing strategy for relying on group 
memberships to protect hearth and home from harm. (p. 641) 
This research found that honor-oriented individuals’ whose group identity, in 
this case their national identity, was threatened would respond according to the “rule of 
retaliation,” just as they would to an affront that threatened their personal identity. Even 
though these individuals’ personal reputations and goods were not being threatened, any 
affront to the honor of the collective was seen as an affront to the honor of the 
individual and thus seen as deserving an aggressive response. 
Honor and Religion 
Religion has not been an area of primary interest in honor research, though it has 
been brought up in certain studies (Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012). Outside of 
psychology, however, the relationship between honor and religion has been considered, 
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albeit non-empirically. In his 2006 book Honor: A History, political scientist James 
Bowman traces the relationship between honor and faith in Christian, Jewish, and 
Islamic doctrines and cultures. Bowman believes the norms of an honor culture to be 
especially incompatible with Christianity, the dominant religion in America, due to 
Christ’s numerous commands to refrain from taking vengeance or engaging in violence, 
such as in the Sermon on the Mount, as quoted at the beginning of this paper (p. 48-49). 
Thus, in Bowman’s perspective, honor and religion (at least in the Christian tradition) 
are inherently opposed because each “demands” supremacy in the practitioner’s life. 
Each belief system promises dire consequences if not held supreme. In an honor culture, 
if one’s honor is neglected, one becomes vulnerable to both physical assault and the 
potential loss of one’s property, while to the religious individual, not valuing the 
teachings of one’s faith as supreme has eternal consequences, such as damnation. The 
problem comes in that, while both belief systems demand to be supreme in their 
practitioner’s lives, each has opposing values; honor, valuing survival, holds the “rule 
of retaliation” as supreme, while Christianity (and, I believe, Judaism and Islam) forbid 
the taking of personal vengeance as a part of one’s submission to God. Thus, one cannot 
hold both honor and religion as supreme at the same moment, but each will have to 
“win” on different issues, such as the rule of retaliation, in what will henceforth be 
referred to as faith/honor conflicts, the resolution of which might, in part, depend upon 
the way in which religion is conceptualized and practiced by the individual in question, 
as well as the momentary salience of both religion and honor. 
Although honor and religion have not been empirically examined together, 
research suggests several superficial similarities, such as finding violence more 
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acceptable when done in the name of the respective belief system (Cohen and Nisbett, 
1997; Widman, 2011), a preference for members of faith or honor-based ingroups, as 
well as dislike for outgroup members (Fitzgerald and Wickwire, 2012; Brewer and 
Yuki, 2013), and even certain teachings regarding the ideal behaviors of men and 
women (Bowman, 2006; Brown, Carvallo, & Imura, 2014). It is also interesting to note 
that all of the most-studied honor cultures are also highly religious, including the 
Protestant “Bible belt” of the Southern U.S., Roman Catholic Spain and Latin/South 
America, and Islamic Turkey (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). However, while 
these superficial similarities might seem to indicate a relationship between religion and 
honor, little research has been conducted to determine whether that relationship actually 
exists 
Multiple Conceptualizations of Religiosity 
 Just as there are multiple facets of honor ideology, so too are there 
multiple ways of being religious. Most research involving religion has conceptualized it 
according to the Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I/E) model of Allport and Ross (1967). Howeer, the 
I/E model is not the only way in which religiosity can be conceptualized. Other ways to 
do this include conceptualizing religion categorically (basic demographic identity), by 
intensity of belief (e.g., fundamentalism and orthodoxy), and according to the teachings 
of religion itself (e.g., authoritarian vs. benevolent “God concepts” [Johnson, Li, Cohen, 
& Okun, 2012]). However, while each of these has its own uses, the I/E model remains 
the most researched and, arguably, the most relevant conceptualization due to its unique 
compatibility with honor research. 
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 The I/E model categorizes religiosity as either “intrinsic” or “extrinsic,” based 
on the underlying motives of the belief. Religiosity is categorized as intrinsic when it is 
the practitioner’s “master motive,” with all other needs being viewed as subordinate to 
religious beliefs and prescriptions. In contrast, extrinsic religiosity is categorized by 
being “lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs,” including the 
needs of “security and solace,” as well as “status and self-justification” (Allport & Ross, 
1967, p. 434).   
It is this extrinsic orientation which makes the I/E model so uniquely suited to 
honor research. Extrinsic religiosity is motivated by the benefits one can gain, 
especially “security and solace” (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434); like honor, it is 
essentially a psychological survival mechanism. Indeed, this motive to pursue “security 
and solace” echoes the “desire to mitigate threats to hearth and home” (Barnes et al., 
2014, p. 656) that underlies the collectivist and masculine facets of honor ideology. 
Thus, it is possible that an extrinsically religious honor endorser would not experience a 
faith/honor conflict in a social retaliatory context, due to “selective shaping” of that 
person’s religious beliefs to conform to the more primary need of maintaining their 
honor (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434), allowing them to easily ignore the tenets of 
Christianity that oppose honor norms such as retaliation. 
 The series of three studies described herein investigates the relationship between 
religion and honor and their joint connections to retaliatory motives in conflict 
situations. Study 1 examines the relationship between a categorical conceptualization of 
religion (i.e., religion measured at its simplest and broadest level) with three different 
facets of honor. Study 2 uses more nuanced measures of religiosity to test the 
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relationships between different facets of honor and different conceptualizations of 
religiosity. Finally, having examined the connection between religious orientation and 
multiple facets of honor ideology, Study 3 examines how the relationship between 
religion and honor might play out in an experimental setting involving social conflict 
and retribution. 
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to determine whether or not a relationship between 
religiosity and honor ideology exists when measuring religiosity at the categorical level 
as simple religious identification. We predicted that a modest relationship would exist 
between categorical religiosity and honor, but that this would be most pronounced for 
honor’s feminine facet. This was due to the feminine facet of honor sharing religion’s 
focus on sexual purity and the domestic sphere. It must be acknowledged that 
measuring religiosity at the categorical level does come with certain limitations, as 
merely identifying oneself by affiliation with a sect or faith gives no detailed 
information regarding one’s beliefs, practices, or the depth of one’s faith (Gorsuch, 
1984). For example, one person might identify as a Christian because he or she 
endeavors to live according to the tenets of this faith, including Christ’s command to 
love and forgive enemies, while another might identify as Christian because he or she is 
American, a culture that has been primarily shaped by Christianity, but this person 
might never attend church or use Christian tenets to guide their behavior. While both of 
these individuals might identify as Christian, their behaviors would potentially be very 





Though our initial data included representatives of multiple faiths and beliefs, the 
religious identity with the largest sample size was Christians (N = 3,786). The second-
largest religious identity represented, Buddhism, had a sample size of only 51, and thus 
all religious faiths besides Christianity were excluded from subsequent analysis due to 
insufficient sample size. We compared our Christian sample to our sample of 
atheists/agnostics (N = 803). Our final sample consisted of 4589 participants (1634 
male, 2955 female; M age = 21, SD age = 2.27; 76.3% Caucasian, 4.9% African-
American, 5.4% Native American/Pacific Islander, 6 % Latino, and 1.2% “other”).  All 
participants were gathered from nine semesters’ worth of prescreening data. 
Prescreening consists of participants completing a large number of scales at the 
beginning of the semester, in order for them to take part in studies later in the semester 
for class credit. 
Measures 
 Religious Identification: Categorical religious identification was assessed via a 
question asking participants to select the option which best represented their primary 
religious affiliation: “Christian-Catholic, Christian-Protestant, Muslim, 
None/Atheist/Agnostic, etc.” 
 Honor Ideology for Manhood (or HIM). The HIM (Barnes et al., 2012) was 
used to assess participants’ endorsement of masculine honor norms. The HIM consists 
of 16 items (a = .93) that test participants’ beliefs about how an honorable man will 
behave, including explicit references to justified retaliation norms (e.g., “A man has the 
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right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting 
name,” “A real man never leaves a score unsettled”) which are assessed on a scale, 
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly agree”). 
 Honor Ideology for Womanhood (or HIW). The HIW (Barnes, et al., 2014) 
was used to assess participants’ endorsement of feminine honor norms. The HIW 
consists of 12 items (a = .91), rated on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 
(“strongly agree”) which tests participants’ beliefs about how an honorable woman will 
behave (e.g., “A good woman avoids any behavior that might bring shame to her 
family,” “A respectable woman never wants to be known as being sexually 
permissive”). Because one of the primary traits of feminine honor is sexual purity 
(Barnes, et al., 2014, p. 644; Vandello & Cohen, 2003), several questions on the HIW 
deal with this issue, implying that a “good” woman is a chaste one. Feminine honor’s 
focus on sexual purity is a value shared by Christianity, which is interpreted by many to 
proscribe any sexual behavior outside of marriage. Due to this shared perspective 
between honor and Christianity, we expected religious individuals to score higher on 
the HIW than would atheists. It is also worth noting that the HIW does not share the 
HIM’s focus on retributive behavior, as personally taking revenge is not normally 
associated specifically with honorable women in honor cultures. 
 Honor Concerns Scale. The HC scale (Ijzerman et al., 2007) was used to assess 
participants’ self-reflective, personal perspectives on honor. The HC scale consists of 
nine statements (a = .86) designed to measure participants’ beliefs about their own 
honor. Like the HIM, the HC scale is designed, in part, to measure the retributive facet 
of honor ideology, and contains questions to this effect (“It is my duty to constantly 
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prepared to defend the honor of my family”) as well as broader questions about how 
personally concerned participants are with their own honor (“My honor is the basis for 
my self-respect”). Unlike the HIM and the HIW, the HC scale’s items make almost no 
reference to gender-specific expectations of honor and are instead written from a 
personal perspective, rather than the abstractly ideological HIM and HIW. These 
statements are assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly 
agree”). 
Results 
We predicted that categorical religiosity would be only modestly related to 
honor ideology, particularly the feminine dimension of honor, as measured by our three 
honor scales. To this end, three ANOVAs were conducted, with each of the three styles 
of honor endorsement as the dependent variable in a 2x2 (Religious/Non-religious X 
Gender) design. We opted to include gender as an exploratory variable, in order to 
ensure that any associations we found were not simply the results of gender differences 
in honor endorsement and religious identity. For the HIM, the main effect of categorical 
religious identification was significant, F (1, 4585) = 135.01, p < .000, d = 0.14, with 
Christians scoring higher (M = 5.09, SD = 1.50) than non-religious people (M = 4.53, 
SD = 1.67). A main effect of gender was also present, F (1, 4585) = 175.83, p < .000, d 
= 0.41, with males scoring higher (M = 5.42, SD = 1.50) than females (M = 4.75, SD = 
1.52). No significant interaction was observed. 
For the HIW, the only significant main effect was of religion, F (1, 4581) = 
652.57, p < .000, d =0.99, with Christians scoring higher (M = 7.03, SD = 1.34) than 
non-religious people (M=5.61, SD=1.59). A significant interaction was also seen 
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between religion and gender, F (1, 4581) = 15.90, p < .000. Post-hoc comparisons using 
the Bonferroni correction revealed all mean differences to be significant, save for that 
between non-religious men and non-religious women (see Table 1). Non-religious 
males scored non-significantly higher on the HIW than did non-religious females, but 
religious females scored significantly higher than religious males did.  
For the HC scale, the main effect of categorical religious affiliation was also 
significant, F (1, 4543) = 250.48, p < .000, d = 0.62, with Christians scoring higher (M 
= 5.60, SD = 1.36) than non-religious individuals (M =4.77, SD = 1.55). A main effect 
was also seen for gender, F (1, 4543) = 15.32, p < .000, d = .12, with males scoring 
higher (M = 5.52, SD = 1.47) than females (M = 5.42, SD = 1.40). No significant 
interaction was observed. 
Discussion 
 Our hypothesis that a modest relationship would exist between categorical 
religiosity and facets of honor ideology was confirmed; categorical religiosity was 
significantly related to all of our honor scales, each measuring a different facet of honor 
ideology (masculine, feminine, and personal). The largest association, as we expected, 
was between feminine honor beliefs and religious identification, consistent with the 
overlap in both belief systems’ norms regarding ideal feminine behavior. Thus, our 
results indicate that a relationship exists between religion and honor. However, our 
conceptualizing religion categorically, without accommodation for specific beliefs, led 
us to believe that further research was necessary. For example, it is possible that an 
intrinsically religious individual will have a very different perspective on honor than an 
extrinsically religious individual, but these differences are not accounted for in Study 1; 
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the two individuals would both have been designated as “religious.” Thus, we elected to 
perform another study in order to determine what different relationships might be 
observed between the same facets of honor and more specific conceptualizations of 
religiosity. 
Study 2 
Study 2 assessed different religious orientations, and also observed how each 
predicted honor endorsement, in order to determine which conceptualizations of 
religion might be more or less compatible with different facets of honor. Though our 
primary interest was in Allport and Ross’s (1967) Intrinsic/Extrinsic Model, due to its 
widespread use and theoretical compatibility with the honor culture literature, we also 
measured fundamentalism, a religious orientation that has previously been used to 
predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2002, 2005; 
Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013). Fundamentalism is a religious orientation categorized 
by the belief that one’s religious beliefs are the only true beliefs, that these beliefs are 
under assault and must be defended, and that there will be eternal consequences for 
doing/not doing so (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). Because of previous findings 
regarding fundamentalism, we included a measure of it to explore its relationship to 
different facets of honor.  
We predicted that extrinsic religiosity would be positively associated with 
retributive facets of honor (the HIM and the HC Scale) due to their theoretical 
compatibility, whereas intrinsic religiosity would be negatively associated due to a 
faith/honor conflict, i.e., a situation where religion and honor both “demand” supremacy 
but compel people to obey inherently opposed behavioral mandates. We also predicted 
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a strong positive relationship to exist between all forms of religiosity and the HIW. The 
feminine facet of honor conceptualizes a “good woman” in much the same way as many 
religions do, including Christianity, so a positive relationship was expected to exist 
between feminine honor and religiosity, consistent with the categorical results of Study 
1.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants were gathered via an online research participation system. As 
compensation for their time, participants were credited an hour’s worth of participation 
credit for their introductory psychology classes. Our final sample size was 247 (71 
male, 176 female; M age = 20, SD age = 1.1; 74.1% Caucasian, 1.6% African 
American, 5.7% Native American/Pacific Islander, 12.6% Asian, 5.3% Hispanic, .4% 
“other”). Only participants who identified as Christian were included in this study. 
Study measures were administered via the Qualtrics online survey program.  
Measures 
 Demographics. As part of the standard demographic questionnaire, participants 
were asked about age, gender, ethnicity, parents’ education, family income, and 
political affiliation.  
Honor. Honor endorsement was measured with the HIM, HIW, and HC scale, 
as in Study 1.  
Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity. Participants’ levels of intrinsic and extrinsic 
religious orientation were assessed via the I/E-Revised Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 
1983). This scale is an updated version of Allport and Ross’s original 1967 measure. 
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We elected to use this measure instead of the 1967 original because of its shorter length 
and higher reliability, as well as its attribution of specific motives for extrinsic 
religiosity. 
The I/E-revised scale is broken down into subscales, each of which highlight 
different motives for religiosity. The intrinsic subscale consists of six items (a =.88), 
consisting of statements such as “I try hard to live all my life according to my religious 
beliefs,” and “My whole approach to life is based on my religion.” The extrinsic scale is 
made up of two subscales, extrinsic-personal, and extrinsic-social, reflecting two 
different motivations behind extrinsic religiosity. The scale can be assessed as a whole, 
using all six items (a =.62), or by each subscale. The personal subscale consists of three 
items (a =.78), such as “What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and 
sorrow,” and “Prayer is for peace and happiness.” The social subscale consists of three 
items (a = .62), such as “I go to church because it helps me make friends,” and “I go to 
church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.” All subscales in the I/E 
scale are measured on a five-point Likert scale where 1 is rated as “strongly disagree” 
and 5 is rated as “strongly agree.” The personal subscale is the measure that is 
theoretically most compatible with honor ideology. As has been previously remarked 
upon (Barnes et al., 2012; 2014), honor endorsing individuals will often focus on the 
collective facet of honor when they feel that they gain safety and security – i.e., when 
they receive a salient personal benefit. Thus, we believe that honor endorsers might 
have a motivation to be extrinsically religious for the personal benefits they receive.  
Fundamentalism. Participants’ religious fundamentalism was measured using 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) Religious Fundamentalism scale. This scale 
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consists of twelve items (a = .86),  such as “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one 
must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion,” and “When you get right down to 
it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be 
rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not,” which are rated on a 9-point Likert scale, 
from -4 (“strongly disagree”) to +4 (“strongly agree”). 
Self-esteem. Previous research has indicated a relationship to exist between self-
esteem and religiosity. Benson and Spilka (1973) found evidence indicating that higher 
self-esteem is related to prosocial, non-aggressive religiosity, while lower self-esteem is 
related to a more vindictive style of religiosity. More recently, Gebauer, Sedikides, and 
Niberich (2011) found that, in cultures that value religion (like the United States), 
religious individuals are more likely to have high self-esteem than are non-religious 
individuals. Self-esteem has also been used as a covariate in previous honor research. 
Thus, we opted to measure self-esteem as an exploratory measure, to see if higher self-
esteem was associated in any way with the different styles of religiosity and honor 
mentioned above, and to control for it as a potential confound if it was. Participants’ 
self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE) (Rosenberg, 
1965). The RSE is a 10-item scale (a =.88) in which participants rate their agreement 
with statements such as “I feel that I have a number of good qualities,” and “On the 
whole, I am satisfied with myself,” on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree), with higher scores representing higher self-esteem. 
Results 
 We predicted that extrinsic religiosity would be positively associated with the 
retributive aspects of honor due to their theoretical compatibility, while intrinsic 
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religiosity would be negatively associated with the retributive facets of honor, due to the 
conflicting norms of each system of thought producing a faith honor conflict. 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the associations 
between study variables (for a full list of correlations, see Table 2). The results of 
correlational analysis provided mixed but generally positive support for our hypotheses. 
The HC scale was not significantly related to the intrinsic religiosity scale, but was 
significantly related to the extrinsic scale (r = .22, p < .01), especially to its personal 
subscale (r = .27, p< .01). The HC scale was similarly related to fundamentalism (r = 
.28, p < .01). The HIM was significantly related to all religiosity measures, but with 
varying degrees of strength. The strongest association was with fundamentalism (r = 
.29, p < .00), followed by the extrinsic religiosity scale’s personal subscale (r = .23, p < 
.01). The association between the HIM and the intrinsic religiosity scale was significant, 
but small (r = .14, p = .03). The HIW was also significantly (and more strongly) related 
to all measures of religiosity, the strongest associations being with the fundamentalism 
scale (r = .57, p < .01) and the intrinsic religiosity scale (r = .45, p < .01), while the 
association with the extrinsic religiosity scale was smaller (r = .21, p < .01). 
 These results provide moderate support for our predictions. Both the HC and the 
HIM contain retributive content, which is incompatible with Christian doctrine. Thus, 
the lack of association between intrinsic religiosity and the HC scale, as well as the 
weak relationship between intrinsic religiosity and the HIM, can be interpreted as 
partially supporting this incompatibility. Similarly, our predictions were supported by 
the findings regarding the feminine facet of honor, as measured by the HIW. The HIW 
was positively associated with all measures of religious orientation, as we had 
 20 
predicted, most likely due to the overlap in how each system of thought conceptualizes 
“good womanhood.”  
 On the whole, the associations among the various measures of religious 
orientation, while all significant, did not raise concerns regarding multi-collinearity. 
While each religious orientation is distinct, they are unlikely to be completely 
independent, as they will have similarities, however small, to other religious 
orientations. However, the strength of the relationship between fundamentalism and 
intrinsic religiosity (r = .83, p < .01) was concerning. Fundamentalism is the belief that 
one’s beliefs are the only true ones, and worthy of defense. Intrinsic religiosity is 
defined by its serving as a “master motive,” with religious teachings and beliefs being 
regarded as supreme. Theoretically, it makes sense that these two religious orientations 
would possess similarities. However, in the literature, they have been observed to 
behave dissimilarly. Intrinsic religiosity has been associated with lessened hostility and 
prejudice, as well as numerous other prosocial behaviors (Allport & Ross, 1967; 
Donahue, 1985; Hunsberger, 1991; Pargament, 2002). In contrast, while 
fundamentalism has been seen to predict prosocial behaviors in certain contexts 
(Blogowska & Saraglou, 2013; Saraglou, 2016), much of the literature still indicates it 
to be primarily associated with prejudice and antisocial behavior towards outgroup 
members (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Mavor & Gallois, 2008). Therefore, the high 
degree of correlation between the measures of these two religious orientations is 
somewhat surprising. However, it is worth noting that, even though they themselves 
were highly correlated with each other, fundamentalism’s correlations with both the HC 
scale and the HIM were significantly higher than intrinsic religiosity’s, indicating that, 
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even if fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity are related concepts, they behave 
somewhat differently with respect to honor.  
 In addition to these correlational analyses, we performed a series of regression 
models in which we regressed different facets of honor onto a single religiosity index, 
with self-esteem, gender, and an interaction term between religiosity and gender 
included as well.1 This regression series supported our hypotheses, while also providing 
a somewhat clearer picture of how each facet of honor related to different religious 
orientations. 
 The HC scale, our measure of personal honor, which contains mild retribution-
related content, was only significantly predicted by the extrinsic religiosity scale, 
especially the personal subscale, which assesses the specific religiosity motive of 
personal benefit. The HIM was predicted by both the extrinsic and intrinsic scales, 
being positively predicted by the former and negatively by the latter. Finally, the HIW 
was positively associated with both fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity. For details 
of regression results, see Table 3. 
 Though we observed some of our anticipated results regarding the HC Scale and 
the HIM, results regarding the HIW were less conclusive. Due to a high correlation 
between the intrinsic and fundamentalism scales, we analyzed a combined model 
containing both predictors, which accounted for approximately 24% of the variance in 
																																																						
1	We also created a latent honor factor for use in regression analysis by submitting total scores on 
the honor scales to an exploratory factor analysis, with principal axis factoring as the extraction 
method. Our latent favor accounted for 58.69% of the total variance in participants’ scores on the 
honor measures. Factor loadings were strongest for the HC scale (.65), followed by the HIM (.63), 
and then the HIW (.57). The use of factor analysis has become common in honor research (Barnes et 
al., 2014), and we used it to comply with the common practice. This latent honor factor was 
positively associated with the extrinsic religiosity scale, but was not significantly associated with the 
intrinsic or fundamentalism scales. 	
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HIW scores, R2 = .24, Adj- R2 = .21, F(7, 164) = 7.57, p < .01. In this model, 
fundamentalism was the only significant predictor of the HIW (b=.50, p < .01).  
 No meaningful, statistically significant results were found with the exploratory 
variable of self-esteem, as measured by the RSE. Thus, the associations we observed 
between religious orientations and facets of honor are not due simply to their correlation 
with self-esteem. Gender, in contrast, was a frequently significant covariate in these 
models, which underscores the importance of controlling for gender when examining 
the association between facets of honor and forms of religiosity. 
Discussion 
 We had hypothesized that honor endorsement would be negatively related to 
intrinsic religiosity and positively related to extrinsic religiosity. Our hypothesis 
received only moderate support. The HIM was, indeed, positively related to a measure 
of extrinsic religiosity and negatively related to a measure of intrinsic religiosity when 
potential confounds were controlled for. However, while the HC was also predicted by 
the extrinsic scale, it had no relationship with the intrinsic scale. Similarly, the HIW had 
no relationship with either extrinsic scale, and its relationship with the intrinsic 
religiosity scale disappeared in a model which also included a measure of 
fundamentalism. However, even though fundamentalism seemed to “swallow” intrinsic 
religiosity’s significance in this model, it remains to be seen if they are, indeed, merely 
different ways of measuring the same construct, or if something else is at play. It is 
possible that the unexpected covariation between these two measures is simply an issue 
of our sample’s coming from the “Bible belt.” In either case, more research will be 
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needed. However, it is worth noting that neither intrinsic religiosity nor fundamentalism 
predicted endorsement of the retributive facets of honor.  
 Overall, a clearer, more nuanced picture of the relationship between religion and 
honor has emerged in this study. The positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity 
and both the HIM and HC scale does support our hypothesis that extrinsic religiosity is 
compatible with honor ideology, due to extrinsic religiosity’s promise of security and 
solace (Allport and Ross, 1967, p. 434), which is compatible with the protective 
motives of honor. Thus, even though Christianity’s teachings prohibit taking revenge, it 
is possible that extrinsically religious honor endorsers “selectively shape” these 
teachings of their faith (Allport and Ross, 1967), thereby allowing them to circumvent 
or ignore this prohibition and continue to respond aggressively in defense of their 
personal and collective self and reputation. 
 It is also worth noting that the HIW was not associated with the extrinsic 
religiosity scale or its subscales, but was only significantly associated with intrinsic 
religiosity and fundamentalism. The former relationship disappeared when a model 
including both religious orientations was analyzed. This may be due to a combination of 
factors. The first is that the intrinsic religiosity scale and the fundamentalism scale are 
very highly correlated. Though previous research, as well as their differing predictive 
power in our own study, indicate that they are not the same construct, there is still a 
great deal of overlap between the two. While they predict different behaviors, both 
intrinsic religiosity and fundamentalism share a deep regard for the primacy and 
authority of religious teaching, as well as a deep belief in the truth of one’s religious 
convictions. These similarities make it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish 
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between the two orientations on a matter like feminine honor, due to feminine honor’s 
focus on sexual purity, which is still shared by a majority of religious faiths, including 
Christianity as practiced in the American South.  
 One of the primary distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity is how 
each treats religious doctrine. Extrinsic religiosity views religious doctrine as malleable, 
altering it via “selective shaping” to meet the needs of security and solace, while 
intrinsic religiosity views doctrine as being of prime importance, above all other wants 
and needs (Allport and Ross, 1967). We had predicted that honor would be positively 
related to extrinsic religiosity because we had conceptualized honor as focused around 
retribution norms, which are proscribed by Christian teachings. However, the HIW does 
not contain this retributive content and, in fact, upholds Christian norms and teachings, 
and so is unlikely to trigger a faith/honor conflict the way the other two facets of honor 
are. Thus, the primary takeaway from our findings regarding the HIW are that the 
relationship between honor and religious orientations depend on the specific ways one 
conceptualizes each. For faith/honor conflicts to occur, it is important that the facets of 
honor being measured are ones which contain norms that are condemned by the 
religious teachings of the sample. Therefore, in Study 3, we investigated specific ways 
to trigger faith/honor conflicts in an experimental setting. 
Study 3 
 Study 2 provided moderate support for our hypotheses by revealing a significant 
positive association between extrinsic religiosity and the retributive facets of honor 
ideology, but a negative association between intrinsic religiosity and the same. 
However, the low effect sizes of Study 2’s regression analyses indicated that there was 
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more to the story. It is unlikely that a clearer understanding of the relationship between 
different facets of honor and different religious orientations can be gained via survey 
alone. By observing how they relate to one another in an experimental setting, we hoped 
to be able to gain a deeper understanding of these constructs. 
 Intrinsic religiosity is theoretically incompatible with the masculine facet of 
honor ideology due to intrinsic religiosity holding as supreme religious teachings 
proscribing retribution. Thus, an intrinsically religious honor endorser is more likely to 
feel a faith/honor conflict because he or she will recognize the incongruity between the 
norms of each system, while the extrinsically religious honor endorser will either not 
recognize the incongruity or will not care about it, due to selective shaping of his or her 
faith.  
We predicted that individuals higher in intrinsic religiosity would experience a 
faith/honor conflict after being presented with a religious prime which forbids revenge, 
due to the theoretical incompatibility of the presented doctrine and honor ideology’s 
rule of retaliation. We predicted that this faith/honor conflict would be less intense, if it 
occurred at all, after exposing participants to a religious prime seeming to indicate 
Divine approval of retaliation. We did not expect differences between conditions for 
individuals high in extrinsic religiosity, due to the lack of conflict between the norms of 
extrinsic religiosity and honor ideology.  
Due to the high correlation between fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity in 
Study 2, we included the same measure of fundamentalism in Study 3. We had no 
strong expectations for results regarding the fundamentalism scale. In the literature, 
fundamentalism has been seen to predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior 
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(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2002, 2005; Blogowska & Saroglou, 2013), and though our 
results in Study 2 showed fundamentalism to behave similarly to intrinsic religiosity, 
we were unsure how fundamentalism would relate to honor ideology, due to the history 
of this concept’s use in religious psychological literature.  
 Fundamentalism, as defined by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2002), has three 
components to it: the belief that one’s religious beliefs are the only true ones, that they 
are under assault and must be defended, and that there will be eternal consequences for 
not believing in and defending them. Thus, fundamentalism shares intrinsic religiosity’s 
valuing of religious teachings as supreme, but adds the components regarding those 
teachings’ being under assault and needing defense. Our correlational analysis in Study 
2 supports this interpretation (r = .83, p < .01). However, these aspects of assault and 
defense present a problem for defining and identifying what different levels of 
fundamentalism look like. 
 The fundamentalism scale does not have subscales, and measures all three 
components of fundamentalism throughout. This leads to a conceptual difficulty when it 
comes to discussing individuals low in fundamentalism. On the one hand, someone with 
a low score on the fundamentalism scale may be intrinsically religious, meaning that 
they do believe their religious beliefs to be the only true ones, but not believe that their 
faith is constantly under assault, or that they need to defend it by silencing other 
competing beliefs. On the other hand, someone with a similarly low score may simply 
consider themselves a “cultural Christian,” and have little regard for the specific 
teachings of their religion. The scale, however, would not differentiate between the two. 
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 This in turn leads to potential difficulty in determining if fundamentalism may 
be used to set up a faith/honor conflict. Someone low in fundamentalism may 
experience a faith/honor conflict because they still value religious teachings and must 
reconcile their honor and faith-related norms. On the other hand, if someone simply 
scored low in fundamentalism because they do not have strong religious beliefs but 
simply identify with a particular faith, they may not be as likely to suffer a faith/honor 
conflict. 
 Finally, we did not predict any experimental effect to be observed for scores on 
the HIW, due to it measuring a different facet of honor than that of the HIM, and thus 
theoretically unrelated to the concepts primed by our experimental manipulation.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were gathered via the University of Oklahoma’s SONA system and 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system. SONA participants were given class 
credit for research participation, while MTurk workers were financially compensated, 
receiving $2 upon completion of the survey. Our final sample size was 157 (54 male, 
102 female; 88 from SONA, 69 from MTurk; M age = 32.36, SD age = 14.08; 72% 
white, 11.5% African American, 7% Hispanic, 5.1% Asian, 3.2% Native 
American/Pacific Islander/Alaska Native, 1.3% “other”). While other participants were 
gathered, only individuals who identified as Christian were included in this study, 
consistent with Study 2.  
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Measures 
 Demographics. Participants’ demographic information was assessed by a 
questionnaire asking about their age, gender, and ethnicity. 
 Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity. Religious orientation was measured by the I/E-
Revised Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1983), as in Study 2. 
 Honor. Honor was assessed with the HIM and the HIW, as in Study 2 (Barnes 
et al., 2012, 2014). The HIM was created based on a range of previous literature in 
which vignettes had been used to measure honor-related outcomes (Barnes et al, 2012), 
and so we opted to use the HIM as our outcome variable. We predicted that scores on 
the HIM would vary as a function of exposure to the religious prime and as a function 
of religiosity style. We did not expect scores on the HIW to vary based on the prime, 
but rather expected the results to mirror Study 2’s, with intrinsically religious 
individuals scoring higher than extrinsically religious individuals on the HIW. 
 Religious Prime. Previous research (Bushman et al., 2006; (Blogowska & 
Saroglou, 2013) has successfully used religious scripture as a prime to induce various 
behaviors and attitudes. We used two primes, one designated “forgiving” and one 
“vengeful.” The “vengeful” prime consisted of a passage taken from the book of I 
Samuel, in which the prophet Samuel calls for the utter annihilation of the Amalekites, 
as per Divine command. The “forgiving” prime consisted of a passage taken from 
Matthew 5, Christ’s famous “Sermon on the Mount,” a selection of which is presented 
before the introduction of this paper. Participants were randomly assigned to read either 
the forgiving or vengeful prime (see Appendix for the full text of the primes). 
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 Fundamentalism. Fundamentalism was assessed as an exploratory variable via 
the Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) Religious Fundamentalism scale, as in Study 2. 
God-Concept. Research has indicated that one’s mental image or representation 
of God, specifically of God’s character as either more benevolent or authoritative 
(called a “God-concept”), can predict both prosocial and antisocial behavior (Benson 
and Spilka, 1979; Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). Thus, for exploratory purposes, 
we examined what types of God-concepts might be associated with different religious 
orientations and facets of honor. The Authoritarian/Benevolent God scale (Johnson, 
Okun, and Cohen, 2015), specifically categorizes individuals’ God concept as either 
benevolent (“B-God”) or authoritarian (“A-God”). B-God is defined by such terms as 
“forgiving” and “gracious,” while A-God is defined by such terms as “punishing” and 
“wrathful” (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2014, p. 229). This scale provided the 
opportunity to examine the content of participants’ religious beliefs, as well as their 
religious orientation. It is possible that an A-God concept is congruent with honor 
ideology, due to this concept’s similarity to the rule of retaliation, and thus may help 
provide a more detailed picture of how religion and honor relate and interact. While 
Bowman conceptualizes Christianity as incompatible with honor, essentially a B-God 
concept, it is possible that intrinsically religious individuals with A-God concepts may 
also be high in honor, as there is little or no conflict between their faith’s teachings and 
their personal beliefs. Thus, this scale was included for exploratory purposes. This scale 
consists of 10 adjectives (a = .71), which are used to construct two subscales with 5 
adjectives each, authoritarian (a = .84) and benevolent (a = .77), which are rated by 
participants as either accurately or inaccurately measuring their concept of God’s 
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character on a 7 point Likert scale, with ratings ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 
7 (“Strongly agree”). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited from SONA and MTurk, with the study being 
described as a test of the behavioral effects of literature. The study was administered via 
the Qualtrics program. Participants were randomly assigned into the forgiving and 
vengeful conditions. Participants took a short survey about their reading habits, after 
which they read their Scriptural prime corresponding to their assigned condition. They 
then responded to this passage, via questions like “how engaging did you find this 
passage?” and “did you enjoy reading this passage?” on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 
being “not at all” and 7 being “very much.” After this, they filled out the HIM and the 
HIW in counterbalanced order. After this, participants read two other literary texts, 
followed by an attention check in which they were asked to pick the “one that did not 
belong” from a series of quotes taken from their condition-corresponding scriptural 
passage. They then read two more literary passages and filled out more response items. 
After this, they filled out the religiosity scales, demographic information, and were 
granted credit for their participation.  
Results 
 We predicted that participants high in intrinsic religiosity would experience a 
faith/honor conflict when presented with an anti-revenge prime, and would either 
experience a lessened conflict, or no conflict at all when presented with a prime 
indicating Divine approval of vengeance. We did not expect to find these differences for 
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those high in extrinsic religiosity, due to its lack of conflict with the norms of honor 
ideology. We did not predict any experimental effect to be observed for the HIW.  
 Before further statistical analyses were conducted, we performed a series of t-
tests to ensure that there were no conditional differences for our participants’ scores on 
any measures of religious orientation. All t-tests were shown to be insignificant, 
indicating that our experimental manipulation did not have any effect on participants’ 
responses to these measures (see Table 4). 
 Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the associations 
between study variables (for a full list of correlations, see Table 5). The results of these 
correlational analyses followed a similar pattern to those obtained in Study 2. 
Specifically, the HIM was significantly predicted by the extrinsic-personal scale (r = 
.26, p < .01), while being unassociated with the measure of intrinsic religiosity. Our 
measure of fundamentalism had a modest correlation with the HIM (r = .19, p <  .05), 
but was highly correlated with our measure of intrinsic religiosity (r = .72, p < .01).  
Of special interest were the observed relationships between the measures of 
authoritarian and benevolent God-concept and our measures of honor ideology. The 
association between A-God concept and the HIM was modest but significant (r = .25, p 
< .01), while there was no association between the HIM and the measure of B-God 
concept (r = -.13, p > .05) The HIW was also significantly related to both God-concept 
measures. This association was approximately the same for the benevolent (r = .22, p < 
.01) and the authoritarian scales (r = .19, p <.05). The two scales were not significantly 
correlated with each other. 
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 In addition to confirming Study 2’s findings regarding the zero-order 
relationships between our variables, including the modesty of associations between 
honor and religiosity, we also performed a series of regression models in which we 
regressed the HIM and the HIW onto different measures of religious orientation along 
with priming condition and a condition X religiosity interaction (see Table 6). 
Participant gender, as well as all potential interactions therewith, were included as 
covariates. These regression models provided mixed support for our hypotheses. 
 Our experimental manipulation had a significant effect on HIM scores across 
regression models, save for that regressing the HIM onto the benevolent God-concept 
scale. Our experimental manipulation was not seen to have an effect on participants’ 
endorsement of the HIW, save for the measures of extrinsic religiosity. Two interactions 
between religiosity and condition were seen for the HIM, potentially indicating the 
successful inducement of faith/honor conflicts (.  
 We had predicted a religiosity X condition interaction for intrinsic religiosity, 
where those higher in intrinsic religiosity would score lower in the forgiving condition 
than in the vengeful condition. We observed precisely the opposite. In the forgiving 
condition, lower levels on intrinsic religiosity were associated with lower levels of 
endorsement of the HIM, while higher levels of intrinsic religiosity were associated 
with higher levels of HIM endorsement (b = .49, p < .01). Levels of intrinsic religiosity 
did not predict differing levels of support for the HIM in the vengeful condition (b = -
.13, p > .05) (see Fig. 1). A similar pattern was seen for fundamentalism. In the 
forgiving condition, lower levels of fundamentalism were associated with lower levels 
of HIM endorsement (b = .63, p < .01), while levels of fundamentalism were not 
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associated with differing support for the HIM in the vengeful condition (b = -.05, p > 
.05) (See Fig. 2).  
 Our hypotheses regarding the HIW were upheld for every religious orientation 
save extrinsic religiosity and its personal subscale, both of which predicted support for 
the HIW. This relationship was marginally stronger for the personal subscale (b = .36, p 
< .05) than for the scale as a whole (b = .33, p < .05). No significant interaction terms 
were observed. 
 Results from regressing honor measures onto the A/B God-concept scales 
mirrored those found in correlational analysis. The authoritarian scale predicted support 
for both the HIM (b = .38, p < .01) and the HIW (b = .41, p < .01), while the benevolent 
scale only predicted support for the HIW (b = .72, p < .05). 
Discussion 
 Our predictions received mixed support from the results of Study 3. We induced 
what seemed to be a faith/honor conflict for both intrinsic religiosity and 
fundamentalism. However, the faith/honor conflict for intrinsic religiosity was contrary 
to our predictions. We expected to see lower levels of endorsement for the HIM for 
highly intrinsic participants in the forgiving condition. We found precisely the opposite: 
those lower in intrinsic religiosity, when primed with a scriptural passage highlighting 
the incompatibility of Christian beliefs with retaliatory honor norms, our participants’ 
endorsement of those norms was weaker than when primed with a scriptural passage 
that indicated the opposite. 
 Before attempting to guess why these results were found, it is important to 
discuss our findings regarding fundamentalism. We included a measure of 
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fundamentalism in Study 3 to see if fundamentalism would behave any differently to 
intrinsic religiosity in an experimental context. We found it to behave similarly; the 
faith/honor conflict was seen in those low in fundamentalism. The lack of clarity 
regarding what it means to be low in fundamentalism (as mentioned in the introduction 
to Study 3) makes it difficult to interpret precisely why it was that individuals low in 
this construct experienced what appeared to be a faith/honor conflict.  
 One explanation for the results for both fundamentalism and intrinsic religiosity 
might involve our vengeful prime. Even for those high in these religious orientations, 
the predicted HIM scores were only around the mid-point of the 9-point scale. The story 
of Samuel and the Amalekites is not well-known, nor is it considered relevant for 
everyday life for most Christians. By contrast, Christ’s Sermon on the Mount is much 
more well-known, even in non-Christian circles. It is possible that our choice of 
vengeful prime may not have had a strong effect in our audience, and that what we 
observed was less the result of the vengeful prime than it was more akin to participants’ 
base level of endorsement of masculine honor norms. Choosing a more relevant or 
better-known passage might have successfully induced the expected faith/honor 
conflicts. One such passage might be Christ’s cleansing of the Temple, an event 
depicted in all four Gospels of the Christian New Testament. While not as strongly 
related to honor themes as our selected Old Testament passage, it is still an example of 
a central Christian figure responding aggressively to a transgression against himself, 
and thus might produce results more in line with our original predictions. 
 Another explanation for the lack of difference between fundamentalism and 
intrinsic religiosity’s results may be the result of our choice in scale. We elected to use a 
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revised version of Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s scale, which has been shortened for 
ease of use. However, it reduces the amount of content focusing on the dynamic of 
assault and defense which is central to the concept of fundamentalism. While the overall 
“flavor” of the scale still contains this, it is possible that the revised scale simply is not 
suitable to pick up on the finer differences from intrinsic religiosity, as discussed in the 
introduction to Study 3. Including the full scale might have produced results which 
differentiated the religious orientations more fully, and future research might benefit 
from its use.  
 Our hypotheses regarding the HIW were upheld, save for extrinsic religiosity. 
One potential explanation for this could again have to do with our choice of prime. The 
Old Testament, unlike the New, has a number of specific rules and regulations 
regarding moral behavior, especially for chastity, as seen in the Pentateuch. Indeed, 
many of these passages regarding chastity are found near passages which could be 
interpreted as supporting retaliatory honor norms, such as “an eye for an eye,” (Exodus 
21:24). Priming the idea of this “Old Testament God” may have primed related 
constructs in our extrinsic participants that they not otherwise have endorsed so 
strongly, such as chastity. Future research might attempt to see if this pattern of 
endorsement occurs if both primes involve Jesus Christ, rather than the “Old Testament 
God.”  
 Exploratory analysis regarding the A/B God-concept scale proved fruitful, with 
the two scales both predicting support for the HIW, but only the authoritarian predicting 
support for the HIM. This, taken with the lack of correlation between the two scales, 
indicates that the A/B God-concept scale might be useful to future research on the 
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relationship between honor and religiosity, as it might provide a clearer picture than the 
I/E scale. 
General Discussion 
 Overall, the relationship between honor and religiosity seems to depend on what 
facet of honor and what type of religious orientation is being considered. Orientations 
that hold divine teaching as supreme seem more weakly linked with honor facets that 
contradict those teachings, while being strongly linked with the facets of honor that 
complement their religious beliefs. Conversely, religious orientations that are less faith-
based and more goal-oriented, such as extrinsic religiosity, seems to have a strong link 
with honor facets that might help fulfill those goals, such as “security and solace.”  
 Our research produced some potential evidence of a faith/honor conflict being 
experimentally induced, but future research should continue to attempt to induce such 
conflicts in other religious orientations and in other experimental settings. Such research 
might benefit from using pre-test/post-test methodology, establishing whether or not 
participants’ honor levels have deviated from a baseline after exposure to a religious 
prime, rather than simply using the HIM as a state measure of honor. Alternatively, a 
vignette-based approach could be used, as in previous honor-related research (Cohen & 
Nisbett, 1997). This could potentially serve as a more concrete response variable, and 
could perhaps be crafted to more clearly be forbidden or permitted by the scripture 
passages in each condition. These passages should also both be drawn from the New 
Testament, if future research intends to make use of an exclusively Christian sample, in 
order to make sure that both passages are of equal salience to participants across 
conditions. 
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 One potential direction future studies could take regarding faith/honor conflicts 
would be to tap further into the collective nature of honor, as has already been done 
with political ideology (Barnes et al., 2014, 2015). Presenting subjects with a threat to 
their Christian identity, gauging their willingness to respond via retaliatory honor 
norms, and seeing if this willingness varies as a function of religious orientation and the 
presentation of scriptural primes might be especially useful. It is possible that in such an 
instance, extrinsically religious honor endorsers (due to the needs of “security and 
solace”) or those high in fundamentalism would respond with greater support for 
retaliatory aggression to an offense against their religious identity, while those higher in 
intrinsic religiosity or a benevolent God-concept might not. 
 For most of the history of the psychology of religion, there has been a quest to 
categorize religious orientations as either “good” or “bad,” depending on their 
behavioral effects. The I/E scale does this, as its authors use value-laden language when 
discussing potential behavioral elements and consequences of each religious orientation. 
In the I/E conceptualization of religiosity, those who truly believe in their religion for 
their religion’s own sake (intrinsic) will be less prejudiced and more prosocial, while 
those who only subscribe to a religious belief for the potential benefit (extrinsic) will be 
more prejudiced and antisocial (Allport & Ross, 1967). Other research has indicated 
that religion may generally make its participants more prone to aggression, violence, 
and other antisocial behaviors (Bushman et al., 2006). The A/B God scale provides a 
new way of looking at religious orientation without the same value-laden content as 
previous conceptualizations.  
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 The advantage of the A/B God scale is that it allows for a clearly-defined 
religious orientation to be deeply held and believed, while still allowing for potential 
antisocial outcomes. In this way, it is superior to the Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2004) 
measure of fundamentalism, in that it differentiates between what might be called 
“fundamentalists” and “evangelicals,” both of whom may have similar teachings but 
different beliefs about God and what behaviors and attitudes He expects of them. The 
A/B God scale also has a conceptual benefit over the I/E scale, in that it does not 
attempt to force the idea of bipolarity onto a concept that cannot conform to it. While 
Allport referred to intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as if they were inherently opposed 
constructs, research in our and other studies showed that there is in fact a mild and 
significant correlation between the two scales, indicating that they are not as 
incompatible as Allport assumed (Allport & Ross, 1967). In contrast, the A/B God-
Concept Scale was designed for both concepts to be used together, even being able to 
serve in the same analysis, should the researcher want it (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 
2015). It is also worth noting that both in Johnson, Okun, and Cohen’s original work 
with the scale (2015) and our own research, the authoritarian and benevolent subscales 
were not significantly correlated with each other, unlike intrinsic and extrinsic 
religiosity. Thus, future research into the relationship between religiosity and honor, as 
well as the general psychological study of religion, might benefit from using the A/B 
God-Concept scale. 
 Religion is incredibly complex and diverse, with numerous orientations and 
ideologies. Given this, it is not surprising that religion should relate differently to 
unique cultural and behavioral phenomena. However, previous research has often failed 
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to account for this, leading to numerous contradictory findings. Investigating cultural 
phenomena like honor ideology brings some clarity to the confusion by showing that 
behavior is not simply a result of one variable, but the relationships between different 
religious orientations and honor facets. It is imperative that research in this area should 
continue to investigate these relationships in order to more fully understand religion’s 
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Appendix A 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. 
Mean Scores on the HIW in Study 1       
 
   Males     Females  
 
Christians  6.90 (1.26)    7.10 (1.37) 
 
N   1222     2561 
 
Atheists  5.73 (1.51)    5.49 (1.65) 
 
N   403     399   
Note: The Bonferroni procedure revealed all mean differences to be significant, save 
that between 
atheist males and atheist females 
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Table 2.  




Study 2 Regression Analyses Results 
 
    HC Scale  HIM   HIW 
     b, t    b, t    b, t  
Extrinsic (total)  .29, 3.4**  .17, 1.37  -.01, -.05 
 Gender  .20, 2.26*  .38, 3.18**   -.04, -0.4 
Extrinsic (social)  .16, 1.67  .01, 0.10  -.12, -1.0 
 Gender  .14, 1.50  .36, 2.86**  -.03, -.24 
Extrinsic (personal)  .39, 3.66**  .31, 2.06*  .15, 1.13 
 Gender  .28, 3.13**  .39, 3.20**    .04, 0.32 
Intrinsic   -.04, -0.36  -.26, 2.03*  .32, 2.85** 
 Gender  .16, 2.13*  .24, 3.17**  -.03, -0.39 
Fundamentalism  .10, 1.03  -.06, -0.46  .51, 5.02** 
 Gender  .19, 2.08*  .39, 3.25**  -.07, -0.74 
*.05 ≥ p ≥ .01; **p < .01. 
Note. All regressions held both self-esteem, measured by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale (1965), and a religious orientation x gender interaction term as constants. Neither 
proved significant in any model. Full models are available upon request.  
Condition and Gender variables were coded as -1/+1 for the vengeful/forgiving primes 




Results for t-test Comparisons of  Participants' Religiosity Scores Across Condition in 
Study 3 




 Vengeful 87 3.48  .99 -.10 145.40  .923 
  




 Vengeful 87 2.54  .67 .29 139.23  .77 
 




 Vengeful 87 3.21  .87 .23 139.16  .82 
 




 Vengeful 87 .32  1.48 .97 140.65  .332 
 




 Vengeful 87 4.16  1.24 .01 149.00  .99 
   




 Vengeful 87 6.15  .72 .18 126.74  .86 
   









Table 6.  
Study 3 Regression Analyses Results 
	
    HIM    HIW 
     b, t     b, t    
Intrinsic Religiosity  .49, 2.31** (forgiving) .98, 6.38** 
    -.13, -.612 (vengeful) 
Condition  .44, 3.13**   .27, 1.86 
 Gender  .59, 4.16**   .18, 1.25 
 Interaction  -.31, -2.09*       
Extrinsic (total)  .40, 2.57**   .55, 3.01**  
Condition  .39, 2.73**   .33, 2.01* 
 Gender  .53, 3.79**   -.21, -1.27   
Extrinsic (personal)  .59, 3.76**   .76, 4.12** 
  
 Condition  .41, 2.87**   .36, 2.18* 
 Gender  .54, 3.81**   -.2, -1.24   
Fundamentalism  .63, 3.21**(forgiving)  .97, 6.52** 
    -.05, 0.24 (vengeful)  
 Condition  .48, 3.47**   .17, 1.15 
 Gender  .71, 5.15**   .11, .725 
             Interaction  -.68, -2.42*       
Authoritarian God Concept .38, 2.67**   .41, 2.47** 
 Condition  .35, 2.59**   .20, 1.29 
 Gender  .51, 3.78**   -.21, -1.34   
Benevolent God Concept -.29, -1.18   .72, 2.52* 
 Condition  .27, 1.62   .06, .33 
 Gender  .48, 2.85**   .10, .54 
 
*.05 ≥ p ≥ .01; **p < .01. 
Note.	Condition and Gender variables were coded as -1/+1 for the vengeful/forgiving 



















Figure 1.  






























Honor Ideology for Manhood Scale (HIM) (Barnes et al., 2012) 
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the 
provided  
 
1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8 -------- 9 
Strongly                                             Neutral                                               Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                          Agree 
 
1. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who calls 
him an insulting name. 
2. A real man doesn’t let other people push him around. 
3. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who 
slanders his family. 
4. A real man can always take care of himself. 
5. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who openly 
flirts with his wife. 
6. A real man never lets himself be a “door mat” to other people. 
7. A real man doesn’t take any crap from anybody. 
8. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who 
trespasses on his personal property. 
9. A real man can “pull himself up by his bootstraps” when the going gets tough. 
10. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who 
mistreats his children. 
11. A real man will never back down from a fight. 
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12. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who steals 
from him. 
13. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who 
vandalizes his home. 
14. A real man is seen as tough in the eyes of his peers. 
15. A man has the right to act with physical aggression toward another man who insults 
his mother. 




Honor Ideology for Womanhood Scale (HIW) (Barnes et al., 2014) 
Rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements using the provided 
scale. 
 
1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8 -------- 9 
      Strongly                     Neutral                                                Strongly 
      Disagree                                                 Agree 
 
 
1. A respectable woman knows that what she does reflects on her family name. 
2. A good woman is loyal to her family members, even when they have behaved 
badly. 
3. A good woman stands by her man at all times. 
4. A respectable woman avoids any behavior that might bring shame on her family. 
5. A good woman never flirts with a man who is not her husband or boyfriend. 
6. A good woman teaches her children the importance of family traditions. 
7. A good woman never tolerates disrespect. 
8. A good woman is always truthful, even when it hurts her. 
9. A respectable woman never wants to be known as being sexually permissive. 
10. A respectable woman never betrays her husband. 
11. A good woman always puts her family first. 
12. A good woman is willing to die for her family. 
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Appendix D 
Honor Concerns Scale (HC Scale) (Ijzerman et al., 2007) 
Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement below, using the  
 
1 -------- 2 -------- 3 -------- 4 -------- 5 -------- 6 -------- 7 -------- 8 -------- 9 
Strongly                                          Neutral                                               Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                     Agree 
 
1. My honor depends on the appreciation and respect that others have for me. 
2. I could not have respect for myself if I did not have any honor. 
3. I think that a public humiliation would be one of the situations that would violate my 
honor the most. 
4. To maintain my honor, I have to be loyal to my family, regardless of the 
circumstances. 
5. I think that honor is one of the most important things that I have as a human being. 
6. I think that the honor of a man would be violated if he were humiliated publicly by 
others. 
7. It is my duty to be constantly prepared to defend the honor of my family. 
8. A family member would violate my honor if he/she were to do something 
disgraceful. 




Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiosity Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) 
Use the scale provided to rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each 
statement below. 
1 --------------------- 2 --------------------- 3 --------------------- 4 --------------------- 5 
 Strongly                      Neutral                                                 Strongly 
Disagree                                                     Agree 
 
1. I enjoy reading about my religion. (Intrinsic) 
2. I go to church because it helps me to make friends. (Extrinsic-social) 
3. It doesn’t much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (Intrinsic)* 
4. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. (Intrinsic) 
5. I have often had a strong sense of God’s presence. (Intrinsic) 
6. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. (Extrinsic-personal) 
7. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs. (Intrinsic) 
8. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. 
(Exrinsic-personal) 
9. Prayer is for peace and happiness. (Extrinsic-personal) 
10. Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life. (Intrinsic)* 
11. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. (Extrinsic-social) 
12. My whole approach to life is based on my religion. (Intrinsic) 
13. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. (Extrinsic-
social) 
 59 
14. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life. 
(Intrinsic)* 
 




Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005) 
Please indicate your reaction to each statement according to the following scale: 
-4 = You very strongly disagree with the statement. 
-3 = You strongly disagree with the statement. 
-2 = You moderately disagree with the statement. 
-1 = You slightly disagree with the statement. 
0 = You feel exactly and precisely neutral about the statement. 
1 = You slightly agree with the statement. 
2 = You moderately agree with the statement. 
3 = You strongly agree with the statement. 
4 = You very strongly agree with the statement. 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed. 
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths 
about life.* 
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously 
fighting against God. 
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right 
religion.* 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t 
go any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given 
humanity. 
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6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the 
world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God, and the rest, who will not. 
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered 
completely, literally true from beginning to end.* 
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally 
true religion. 
9. “Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no 
such thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.* 
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.  
11. The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or 
compromised with others’ beliefs. 
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no 
perfectly true, right religion.* 




Authoritarian/Benevolent God Scale (A/B God-Concept Scale) (Johnson, Okun, & 
Cohen, 2015) 
Instructions: There are many ways of thinking about God, a Higher Power, or a divine 
Life Force, but some of God’s traits may seem more relevant to us than others. Using a 
WIDE RANGE OF THE SCALE below, please rate how well each word describes 
God--BASED UPON YOUR OWN, PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND BELIEFS (as 
opposed to what you 'should' believe or what is theologically or philosophically 
correct): (Items are randomized on the page). 
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Somewhat disagree 
4 = Neither agree nor disagree 
5 = Somewhat agree 
6 = Agree 
7 = Strongly agree 
Authoritarian factor items: 
Wrathful  Punishing  Strict  Stern  Commanding  
Benevolent factor items  




Vengeful Prime (Study 3) 
 
1 Samuel 15: 1-5, 7-9, 17-19, 32-33 
 
 Samuel also said to Saul, “The Lord sent me to anoint you king over His people, 
over Israel. Now therefore, heed the voice of the words of the Lord. Thus says the Lord 
of Hosts; ‘I will punish Amalek for what he did to Israel, how he ambushed him on the 
way when he came up from Egypt. Now go and attack Amalek, and utterly destroy all 
that they have, and do not spare them. But kill both man and woman, infant and nursing 
child, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.’” So Saul gathered the people together and 
numbered them in Telaim, two hundred thousand foot soldiers and ten thousand men of 
Judah. And Saul came to a city of Amalek, and lay in wait in the valley. And Saul 
attacked the Amalekites, from Havilah all the way to Shur, which is east of Egypt. He 
also took Agag, king of the Amalekites, alive and utterly destroyed all the people with 
the edge of the sword.  But Saul and the people spared Agag and the best of the sheep, 
the oxen, the fatlings, the lambs, and all that was good, and were unwilling to utterly 
destroy them. But everything despised and worthless, that they utterly destroyed…	So 
Samuel said, “When you were little in your own eyes, were you not head of the tribes of 
Israel? And did not the Lord anoint you king over Israel? Now the Lord sent you on a 
mission, and said, ‘Go, and utterly destroy the sinners, the Amalekites, and fight against 
them until they are consumed.’ Why then did you not obey the voice of the Lord? Why 
did you swoop down on the spoil, and do evil in the sight of the Lord?”…Then Samuel 
said, “Bring Agag, king of the Amalekites, here to me.” So Agag came to him 
cautiously. And Agag said, “Surely the bitterness of death is past.” But Samuel said, 
“As your sword has made women childless, so shall your mother be childless among 
women.” And Samuel hacked Agag in pieces before the Lord in Gilgal. 
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Apendix I 
Forgiving Prime (Study 3) 
Matthew 5, 1-11, 21-22, 38-48, New King James Version 
And seeing the multitudes, Jesus went up on a mountain, and when He was 
seated His disciples came to Him. Then He opened His mouth and taught them, saying: 
“Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.  Blessed are those 
who mourn, for they shall be comforted.  Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the 
earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be filled. 
Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for 
they shall see God.  Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God. 
Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom 
of heaven. Blessed are you when they revile and persecute you, and say all kinds of evil 
against you falsely for My sake…You have heard that it was said to those of old, ‘You 
shall not murder, and whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ But I say to 
you that whoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the 
judgment. And whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca!’ shall be in danger of the council. 
But whoever says, ‘You fool!’ shall be in danger of hell fire…You have heard that it 
was said, ‘An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I tell you not to resist an evil 
person. But whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also. If anyone 
wants to sue you and take away your tunic, let him have your cloak also. And whoever 
compels you to go one mile, go with him two. Give to him who asks you, and from him 
who wants to borrow from you do not turn away. You have heard that it was said, ‘You 
shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies, 
bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who 
spitefully use you and persecute you,  that you may be sons of your Father in Heaven. 
 
